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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ application of the Alien 
Tort Statute (“ATS”) in its recent decision Cardona v. Chiquita Brands 
International, Inc. demonstrates a mechanical and restrictive 
application of the holding of the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Company.1  The Eleventh Circuit declared that since 
none of Chiquita Brands International’s (“Chiquita”) relevant 
conduct took place within the United States, U.S. courts lacked the 
power to review the claims of over four thousand Colombians who 
sought to hold Chiquita liable for the deaths of family members.2 
In March 2007, Chiquita, a major U.S. multi-national 
corporation, pled guilty to a federal felony of knowingly providing 
material support to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (“AUC”), 
a paramilitary terrorist organization notorious for its mass murder 
of Colombian civilians.3  Chiquita argued that the AUC extorted its 
support as payment for protection, and that Chiquita never received 
services in exchange for those payments from the AUC.4  However, 
Chiquita “fail[ed] to square its claimed victimhood with the facts.”5  
Contrary to Chiquita’s claims that these payments were extorted, 
internal company documents published by the National Security 
Archive (“NSA”), an independent research group, strongly suggest 
that the transactions provided specific benefits to Chiquita.6  By its 
 
 1  Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014); Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 2  Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1188. 
 3  Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 
F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-14898) (“Chiquita’s assistance to the AUC was a 
federal crime because the U.S. Government had officially designated the AUC a 
‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’ and a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist,’ and thus, 
a threat to the security of foreign policy of the United States.”). 
 4  Jim Lobe & Aprille Muscara, US Banana Firm Hired Colombia Paramilitaries, 
ALJAZEERA (April 8, 2011, 2:28 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011 
/04/20114813392621189.html; see also Erik Larson & Christie Smythe, Chiquita Wins 
Dismissal of U.S. Suits on Colombia Torture, BLOOMBERG BUS.  (July 25, 2014, 8:35 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-24/chiquita-wins-dismissal-of-u-
s-suits-over-colombia-torture-1- (“No executives were charged under the deal, which 
was reached when Chiquita was represented by then-Covington & Burling LLP lawyer 
Eric Holder, now the U.S. attorney general.”). 
 5  See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 12, United States v. Chiquita Bananas 
Int’l, Inc., No. 07-055 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Chiquita Sentencing Hearing] 
(arguing that “[a]s a multi-national corporation, Defendant Chiquita was not forced to 
remain in Colombia for 15 years, all while paying the three leading terrorist groups 
terrorizing the Colombian people”). 
 6  Jim Lobe & Aprille Muscara, US Banana Firm Hired Colombia Paramilitaries, 
ALJAZEERA (April 8, 2011, 2:28 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011 
/04/20114813392621189.html. The documents consist of more than 5,500 pages of 
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own account, between 1997 and 2008, Chiquita made over one 
hundred payments to the AUC, totaling $1.7 million, in addition to 
assisting the AUC in “smuggling arms and ammunition with full 
knowledge that the AUC was a violent organization responsible for 
crimes against humanity.”7 
During this period of support, 3,778 people were murdered in 
the Uraba region of Colombia, with an additional sixty thousand 
people forced into what is now the second largest internally 
displaced population in the world.8  As the Colombian people were 
terrorized, from 2001 to 2004, Chiquita turned a $49.4 million 
profit from its Colombia operations.9  “The company, having 
knowingly and repeatedly approved transactions its own lawyers 
were flagging, also went to great lengths to disguise the payments, 
using special vocabulary in company accounting records and 
various intermediaries on the ground in Colombia”; however, none 
of the dozens of high level officials who approved the payments 
have been prosecuted, nor have any reparations been paid to the 
victims.10  Chiquita executives classified the payments as “the cost 
of doing business in Colombia”—a cost that included a shipment 
of three thousand AK-47 assault rifles and five million rounds of 
ammunition.11  Nevertheless, Chiquita maintains that it only paid 
militias to protect employees and that it should not be held 
responsible for the tragic violence that plagued Colombia.12  
Notwithstanding the corporation’s cursory justifications, Chiquita 
aided the AUC because it benefitted from the AUC’s pacification of 
 
internal Chiquita memos which “reinforce the claim . . . that the company was 
knowingly complicit in, and thus liable for, the atrocities committed by the AUC” 
while on the Chiquita payroll.  Id. (quoting Arturo Carrillo, director of George 
Washington University’s International Human Rights Clinic). 
 7  Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 3, at 1–2; Chiquita Sentencing Hearing, 
supra note 5, at 29 (“What makes this conduct so morally repugnant is that the 
company went forward month after month, year after year, to pay the same terrorists.”).  
 8  Steven Cohen, How Chiquita Bananas Undermined the Global War on Terror, THINK 
PROGRESS (Aug. 2, 2014, 2:45 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/08/02/346 
6915/chiquita-colombia-ruling/.  
 9  Chiquita Sentencing Hearing, supra note 5, at 13. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Associated Press, Chiquita Accused of Funding Colombia Terrorists, CBS NEWS (May 
31, 2011, 8:20 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/chiquita-accused-of-funding-
colombia-terrorists/ (“In a 1997 handwritten note, one Chiquita executive said such 
payments are the ‘cost of doing business in Colombia.’ ‘Need to keep this very 
confidential—people can get killed.’”). 
 12  Erik Larson & Christie Smythe, Chiquita Wins Dismissal of U.S. Suits on Colombia 
Torture, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 25, 2014, 8:35 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2014-07-24/chiquita-wins-dismissal-of-u-s-suits-over-colombia-torture-1-. 
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the banana-growing regions and the suppression of labor union 
activity and other social unrest that could have harmed Chiquita’s 
operations.13 
This Note argues that the dissent in Cardona was correct in that 
Chiquita’s connections to the United States displaced the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.  Chiquita is incorporated 
and headquartered in the United States, and Chiquita’s 
participation in reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of 
payments and weapons shipments to a Colombian terrorist 
organization all took place from its U.S.–based corporate offices.  
Part II of this Note will discuss the foundation of ATS litigation, 
from the enactment of the 1789 Judiciary Act through the Kiobel 
decision.  Part III will outline and analyze the growing split amongst 
circuit courts regarding their application of Kiobel.  Finally, Part IV 
will examine Cardona by reconsidering the dissent and exploring the 
divergent treatment of corporate liability and aiding and abetting 
liability under the ATS.  Additionally, Part IV will discuss certain 
international and human rights doctrinal debates which are 
implicated through ATS litigation. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
The ATS was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
granting the national government control over foreign affairs.14  
However, the ATS laid dormant and was essentially ignored for over 
two centuries, until its revival in 1980 by way of the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, as well as the 
rapid expansion of the human rights movement in the late-
twentieth century.15 
 
 13  Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 3, at 2, 10–13 (stating that through this 
strategic alliance, Chiquita was able to eliminate union organizers and others it 
perceived as hostile to its interests, and whom the AUC perceived as guerilla 
sympathizers, reduce operating costs, and eliminate disruptions and competition). 
 14  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States.”); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77  
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). 
 15  Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (referring to the ATS as 
a “rarely-invoked provision”); see also IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 
1975) (calling the ATS “a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since 
the first Judiciary Act, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), no one seems to know whence it 
came.”). 
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A. Revival of the ATS: Filartiga v. Peña-Irala 
Filartiga concerns the 1976 fatal kidnapping and torture of 
Joelito Filartiga in Paraguay by Americo Peña-Irala, a Paraguayan 
police officer, in retaliation for the human rights advocacy and 
political beliefs of Joelito’s father, a Paraguayan physician and 
activist.16  Dr. Filartiga commenced a criminal action in the 
Paraguayan courts against Peña-Irala, unaware that he had fled to 
the United States.17  Joelito’s sister, who was then living in 
Washington, D.C., caused Peña-Irala to be served with a complaint, 
which alleged that Peña-Irala had wrongfully caused the death of 
her brother by torture.18  The district court dismissed the case, 
holding that it was constrained by dicta contained in two recent 
opinions that stated that the State’s treatment of its own citizens did 
not violate international law.19 
The Carter administration filed an amicus brief supporting the 
Filartigas’ view that the ATS provided jurisdiction over their claim 
because: (1) the ATS incorporates an evolving body of international 
law that affords individual rights that can be directly enforced in 
domestic courts; (2) the judiciary had the authority to decide the 
case despite foreign affairs implications; and (3) litigation in 
Paraguay would not be possible.20  Less than a month after the 
executive branch filed its brief, the court in Filartiga held that official 
torture is unambiguously prohibited by the law of nations, noting 
that the ultimate scope of the fundamental rights conferred by 
international law “will be subject to continuing refinement.”21  
Further, the court held that the ATS affords federal jurisdiction for 
adjudication over claims that violate universally accepted norms of 
international law.22 
B. Cautious Optimism: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic 
The first judicial response after Filartiga came in Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic, where the D.C. Circuit Court found that a claim 
 
 16  Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 17  Id. at 878–79. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. at 880 (citing Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976)); IIT v. 
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975)).  
 20  Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).  
 21  Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that the dictum in Dreyfus 
v. von Finck relied on by the district court “is clearly out of tune with the current usage 
and practice of international law”). 
 22  Id. at 877. 
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of ATS jurisdiction based on acts of terrorism—specifically, an 
armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel—should be dismissed; 
however, the judges disagreed as to the reasoning, as illustrated by 
the three separate concurring opinions.23  Judge Edwards largely 
adhered to the legal principles established in Filartiga, but found 
that factual distinctions precluded a finding of subject matter 
jurisdiction, while Judge Robb would have dismissed the case on 
political question grounds.24 
Judge Bork, however, insisted that the federal courts had no 
power to recognize a cause of action for the claims at issue in either 
Filartiga or Tel-Oren.25  According to Judge Bork, such a cause of 
action would intrude upon the foreign affairs powers of the 
executive branch, a result that could not possibly have been what 
the drafters of the ATS intended.26  Judge Bork’s critical response to 
Filartiga stemmed from a formalist notion of separation of powers 
that implicitly rejects the vision of the ATS as a mechanism for 
developing international law norms.27 
C. Affirmation of Modern ATS Litigation: Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain 
In 2004, the Supreme Court made its first pronouncement on 
the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.28  The Court determined that the 
ATS was purely jurisdictional, and “is best read as having been 
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide 
a cause of action for the modest number of international law 
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”29  
Additionally, the Court held that the jurisdictional grant of the ATS 
took effect from the moment of its enactment, as it was not passed 
“to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state 
legislature.”30 
Sosa involved a Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) agent who, 
 
 23  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Compare 
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring), with Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 
(Robb, J., concurring). 
 24  Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776, 796. 
 25  Id. at 798–823 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 26  Id. (Bork, J., concurring). 
 27  Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 28  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). 
 29  Id. at 724. 
 30  Id. at 719 (“The anxieties of the pre-constitutional period cannot be ignored 
easily enough to think that the statute was not meant to have a practical effect.”).  
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while on assignment in Mexico, was captured, tortured and killed.31  
Based on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials believed Alvarez-
Machain (“Alvarez”), a Mexican physician, was present at the house 
to prolong the agent’s life in order to extend the interrogation and 
torture.32  When requests for help to the Mexican government 
proved fruitless, the DEA successfully executed a plan to hire 
Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez and bring him to the United 
States for trial.33  However, Alvarez returned to Mexico and began a 
civil action against Sosa, several DEA agents, several Mexican 
civilians, and the United States after the Supreme Court found that 
Alvarez’s forcible seizure did not affect the jurisdiction of a federal 
court.34 
Although the Supreme Court asserted that district courts could 
recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the 
law of nations, the Court restrained the discretion that district courts 
should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind.35  
The Supreme Court required “any claim based on the present-day 
law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted 
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to 
the features of the 18th-century paradigms.”36  Offenses of the law 
of nations specifically included violations of safe conduct, 
infringement on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.37  Therefore, 
the Supreme Court reasoned, a single illegal detention of less than 
a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and 
a prompt arraignment, does not fall within the three spheres of 
conduct that violate customary international law norms so as to 
support the creation of a federal remedy.38 
D. Limiting Extraterritoriality: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
The majority of modern ATS debate stems from the Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company decision, which brought virtually all 
pending ATS litigation to a halt.39  The plaintiffs in Kiobel were 
 
 31  Id. at 697.  
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. at 698. 
 34  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004). 
 35  Id. at 724. 
 36  Id. at 725. 
 37  Id. at 715. 
 38  Id. at 738. 
 39  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Rich Samp, 
Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum & the Future of Alien Tort 
Litigation, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/ 
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Nigerian nationals who were granted political asylum in the United 
States.40  The plaintiffs claimed that Dutch, British, and Nigerian 
corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in 
committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.41  More 
specifically, the complaint alleged that Nigerian military and police 
forces attacked plaintiffs’ villages, beating, raping, killing, and 
arresting residents, and destroying or looting property.42  These 
vicious attacks suspiciously occurred after plaintiffs began 
protesting the environmental effects of Royal Dutch Petroleum’s oil 
exploration and production in the region.43  The Supreme Court’s 
unanimous decision was fractured by four distinct opinions.44 
The majority of the Court, led by Chief Justice Roberts, joined 
by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, held that courts 
exercising their power under the ATS are constrained by the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.45  The presumption 
against extraterritoriality states that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,” and to 
rebut the presumption, a statute would need to demonstrate a “clear 
indication of extraterritoriality.”46  Although the Court originally 
granted certiorari to consider whether the law of nations recognizes 
corporate liability, the majority reasoned that the Kiobel plaintiffs’ 
claims were barred because the events occurred on the soil of a 
foreign sovereign state.47  As Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged, 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is typically used to 
discern whether the substantive content of laws applies abroad, in 
contrast to the ATS, which is utilized to determine jurisdictional 
 
2013/04/18/supreme-court-observations-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-the-future-
of-alien-tort-litigation/. 
 40  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63. 
 41  Id. at 1662–63.  
 42  Id.  
 43  Id.  
 44  Id. at 1659. 
 45  Id. at 1669. 
 46  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–65 (2013) 
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)); see also EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (This presumption “serves to protect 
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could 
result in international discord.”).  
 47  Id. at 1663 (After oral argument, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file 
supplemental briefs addressing an additional question: “Whether and under what 
circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of 
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States.”).  
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issues and does not regulate conduct or afford relief.48 
Although the Court in Kiobel found that all the relevant conduct 
took place outside the United States, the Court also stated that “even 
where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United 
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against exterritorial application.  Corporations are 
often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say 
mere corporate presence suffices.”49  The majority opinion, 
however, gave no indication of what may constitute sufficient 
contact to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.  This 
lack of clarity is lamented in the concurring opinions.50 
Justice Kennedy’s deciding fifth vote is accompanied by a 
concise and explicit opinion, in which he agreed with the Court’s 
narrow holding, tailored to the case at hand.51  Nevertheless, Justice 
Kennedy also acknowledged that in cases of extraterritorial human 
rights abuses committed abroad, where neither the Kiobel holding 
nor a statute, such as the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 
(“TVPA”), are applicable, “proper implementation of the 
presumption against extraterritorial application may require some 
further elaboration and explanation.”52 
Justice Alito argued in his concurrence that causes of action 
under the ATS should be barred unless the domestic conduct 
violates an international law norm sufficient to meet the Sosa 
requirements of definitiveness and acceptance among nations.53  
Since none of the acts in Kiobel took place domestically, Justice Alito 
would find the claim barred by the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.54 
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer rejected invoking the 
presumption against extraterritoriality because it “rests on the 
perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to 
 
 48  Id. at 1664; see Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to 
“Foreign Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www. 
scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-
squared-cases/ (calling the presumption against extraterritoriality an “odd fit” in the 
ATS context). 
 49  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 50  Id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority’s narrow approach 
leaves much unanswered). 
 51  Id. at 1669–70 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 52  Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006).  
 53  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 54  Id.; see discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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domestic, not foreign matters.”55  Under Justice Breyer’s test, there 
would be jurisdiction under the ATS where: “(1) the alleged tort 
occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, 
or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an 
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct 
interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor 
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other 
common enemy of mankind.”56  Furthermore, Justice Breyer relied 
on Sosa to determine the extent to which the courts may allow the 
ATS claims of those harmed by activities that take place abroad, and 
provided a measure of guidance regarding the majority’s standard.57 
While the first prong of Justice Breyer’s test is not controversial, 
the second and third prongs present the possibility of divergence 
from the majority standard.58  Ultimately, Justice Breyer agreed with 
the majority and concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims in Kiobel did 
not fall within the jurisdictional purview of the ATS.59  In arriving at 
his conclusion, Justice Breyer noted that all parties involved were 
U.S. citizens, the conduct occurred abroad, and there was no distinct 
U.S. interest present in the case.60 
III. KIOBEL AFTERMATH: ANALYSIS OF THE GROWING SPLIT 
This part will evaluate the growing split amongst circuit courts 
in light of the minimal guidance provided by the Kiobel decision.  
Since Kiobel, courts have applied the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to all ATS litigation.  Yet circuit courts have 
employed the presumption, and its ancillary touch and concern test, 
in both narrow and broad fashions.61  As courts continue to 
decipher Kiobel, questions regarding the kinds of allegations that are 
sufficient to satisfy the touch and concern requirement, as well as 
issues of corporate liability, remain unresolved.62 
 
 55  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1672 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)). 
 56  Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 57  Id. at 1671–72 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Congress has not sought to 
limit the statute’s jurisdictional or substantive reach in the wake of Sosa).  
 58  Compare Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669, with Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 59  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1678 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 60  Id. 
 61  See discussion infra Part III.A–B. 
 62  Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Multiple Futures of Corporate Liability for 
Human Rights Violations, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (2013) (“[G]iven the level of public 
interest in the case and the extensive briefing, it was a shock that the Kiobel Court was 
utterly silent on whether corporations even in principle can have international 
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In Kiobel, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank, which established the principal that 
“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none.”63  Nonetheless, Kiobel was not a death 
sentence for the ATS; it only eliminated the particular kind of ATS 
actions discussed in Morrison: “foreign cubed” ATS actions in which 
(1) foreign plaintiffs are suing (2) a foreign defendant in an 
American court for conduct that took place entirely within (3) 
foreign territory.64  Therefore, “foreign squared” cases, where the 
plaintiff or defendant is a U.S. national or where the conduct 
occurred on U.S. soil may still be “on the table.”65 
Chief Justice Roberts appeared to leave the door open for ATS 
cases involving U.S. plaintiffs or U.S. defendants abroad, even if 
only narrowly, by espousing the touch and concern requirement.66  
However, in the entirety of the Kiobel majority opinion, Chief Justice 
Roberts referenced the touch and concern requirement exactly once, 
leaving many questions as to what specifically the test entails.67 
A. Misguided Clarity: Kiobel’s Phantom Bright Line Rule 
In Balintulo v. Daimler AG, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that, where plaintiffs have failed to allege that any relevant 
conduct occurred in the United States, Kiobel foreclosed the 
plaintiffs’ ATS claims.68  In Balintulo, South African victims of 
apartheid brought suits against corporate defendants, including 
Daimler, Ford, and IBM, for aiding and abetting violations of 
customary international law committed by the South African 
government.69  The court pointedly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument 
that, although “mere corporate presence” is inadequate to touch and 
concern the United States with “sufficient force,” corporate 
 
obligations to respect human rights norms.”). 
 63  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255). 
 64  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247, 283 n.11 (emphasis added); see Hathaway, supra note 
48.  
 65  Hathaway, supra note 48.  
 66  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; Hathaway, supra note 48. 
 67  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“And even where the claims touch and concern the 
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application. Corporations are often present in 
many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence 
suffices.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 68  Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 69  Id. at 179–80 (Plaintiffs claim that these subsidiary companies sold cars and 
computers to the South African government and consequently facilitated the apartheid 
regime’s innumerable race-based injustices, rapes, tortures, and extrajudicial killings.).  
STYLIANOU FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  9:05 PM 
230 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 40:1 
citizenship in the United States is satisfactory.70  However, the court 
did not address the factual distinctions between corporate 
citizenship and mere corporate presence.71  The court reiterated that 
the relevant conduct occurred in South Africa, ignoring the touch 
and concern element of the majority’s opinion in Kiobel, and 
maintaining that the court had “no reason to explore, less explain, 
how courts should proceed when some of the relevant conduct 
occurs in the United States.”72 
The Second Circuit adopted the view expressed by Justice Alito’s 
concurrence in Kiobel while at the same time recognizing that a 
majority of the Supreme Court did not share this view.73  The Second 
Circuit justified the application of Justice Alito’s test by stating that, 
while the Supreme Court did not embrace it, “it did not reject it 
either; the majority simply left open any questions regarding the 
permissible reach of causes of action under the ATS when some 
domestic activity is involved in the case.”74  However, the same logic 
can be used to apply the views of Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which 
would have allowed jurisdiction since the defendant was a US 
citizen.75  Curiously, the court in Balintulo cites Kiobel in support of 
the Second Circuit’s holding that corporations are not proper 
defendants under the ATS when it is unmistakable that the case was 
decided on other grounds.76  The court simultaneously denied that 
the apartheid victims had alleged any relevant U.S.-based conduct 
and ignored allegations that the defendants took affirmative steps 
in the United States to circumvent the sanctions regime by 
supplying the South African government with their products, 
despite legal restrictions against trade with South Africa.77  The 
Second Circuit held that this U.S.-based conduct was not tied to the 
relevant human rights violations.78 
 
 70  Id. at 189–90 (“Accordingly, if all relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is 
simply the end of the matter under Kiobel.”).  
 71  Id. at 191. 
 72  Id. (emphasis added). 
 73  Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 191 n.26 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 74  Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, 
Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 45–46, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying Kiobel to foreclose 
jurisdiction over ATS claims filed by a Bangladeshi plaintiff who allegedly was detained 
and tortured by the Bangladesh National Police at the direction of his Bangladeshi 
business partner). 
 75  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 76  Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 191 n.26. 
 77  Id. at 192. 
 78  Id. 
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The Eleventh Circuit has reached similar conclusions.79  In 
Baloco v. Drummond Company, the court concluded that the claimed 
violations of the law of nations did not meet the touch and concern 
test established by Kiobel and thus did not displace the presumption 
against extraterritorial application.80  For this reason, the claims 
were dismissed.  The plaintiffs alleged that Drummond Company, 
a closely held corporation with its principal place of business in 
Alabama, operated a coal mining operation in Colombia that aided 
and abetted or conspired with the AUC by directly funding some of 
its operations.81  The plaintiffs also alleged that Drummond 
collaborated with the AUC to commit a number of murders.82  Since 
these murders occurred in the context of an armed conflict between 
the AUC and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(“FARC”), a leftist guerilla organization, the plaintiffs classified the 
murders as war crimes.83 
The Eleventh Circuit found that, since the extrajudicial killings 
and war crimes alleged in the complaint occurred in Colombia, the 
conduct was not sufficient to warrant the extraterritorial application 
of the ATS, notwithstanding the fact that Drummond was a U.S. 
national.84  However, unlike Kiobel, which did not involve a U.S. 
corporate national or any defendant conduct that occurred within 
the United States, the court in Baloco admitted that “these murders 
‘touch and concern the territory of the United States (because of 
Drummond’s alleged involvement).”85  Nonetheless, the court ruled 
that the “claims are not focused within the United States” and thus 
failed to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.86  Furthermore, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request 
for remand, which would have allowed the district court to consider 
 
 79  See generally Jaramillo v. Naranjo, No. 10-21951, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138887 
(S.D. Fla. 2014) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a narrow reading of post-
Kiobel ATS jurisdiction that focused primarily on the territorial location of the 
allegations). 
 80  Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 81  Id. at 1233. 
 82  Id. at 1234. 
 83  Id. (explaining that the AUC is an organization affiliated with Colombia’s 
military and which provided security against guerilla attacks for Drummond’s coal 
mining facility and operations). 
 84  Id. at 1236 (stating that the issue is not whether the murders “touch and 
concern” the United States, as plaintiffs suggest, but rather whether the murders “touch 
and concern the territory of the United States”) (citing Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669).  
 85  Id. at 1237–38 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 (2010)). 
 86  Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1237 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining 
that the extraterritoriality inquiry turns on where the transaction that is the focus of the 
statute at issue occurred) (emphasis in original). 
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the plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint in light of Kiobel.87  
B. Touch and Concern as a Fact Based Analysis 
In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., the Fourth Circuit 
held that the plaintiffs’ claims, which alleged that a U.S. corporation 
tortured and mistreated Iraqi citizens during their detention at the 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq as suspected enemy combatants, touched 
and concerned the territory of the United States with sufficient force 
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of 
the ATS.88  Due to a shortage of trained military interrogators, the 
United States hired CACI Premier Technology, Inc. (“CACI”), a 
corporation domiciled in Virginia, to provide private 
interrogators.89  The plaintiffs alleged that CACI employees 
instigated, directed, participated in, encouraged, and aided and 
abetted illicit conduct towards the detainees.90  Additionally, the 
plaintiffs alleged that CACI’s managers failed to investigate or to 
report accusations of wrongdoing and repeatedly denied that any 
CACI employees had engaged in abusive conduct.91  The Fourth 
Circuit maintained that the clear implication of the Supreme Court’s 
language regarding touch and concern is that the court should not 
assume that the presumption categorically bars cases that manifest 
a close connection to U.S. territory.92  Rather, “a fact-based analysis 
is required in such cases to determine whether courts may exercise 
jurisdiction over certain ATS claims.”93 
In evaluating the touch and concern requirement, the court 
evaluated several factors, namely CACI’s permission from the U.S. 
government “to conduct interrogations and obtain security 
clearances, and allegations that CACI managers in the United States 
acquiesced in, or concealed, misconduct.”94  By distinguishing the 
attenuated connection to U.S. territory reflected by Kiobel’s facts 
 
 87  Id. at 1239. 
 88  Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014); 
Jonathan Stempel, Abu Ghraib Torture Lawsuit Revived by US. Appeals Court, REUTERS 
(June 30, 2014, 2:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/30/us-abughraib-
caci-idUSKBN0F51BK20140630 (“Photos depicting abuse of Abu Ghraib detainees 
emerged in 2004.  Some detainees claimed they endured physical and sexual abuse, 
infliction of electric shocks, and mock executions.”). 
 89  Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520. 
 90  Id. at 520–22. 
 91  Id.  
 92  Id. at 528–29. 
 93  Id. (considering a broader range of facts than the location where the plaintiffs 
actually sustained their injuries). 
 94  Stempel, supra note 88. 
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from the allegations of torture committed by U.S. citizens who were 
employed by a U.S. corporation in Al Shimari, the court was able to 
conclude that these claims surpass the “mere corporate presence” 
that was fatal in Kiobel, thus overcoming the presumption of 
extraterritoriality.95  The court observed that “mechanically applying 
the presumption to bar these ATS claims would not advance the 
purposes of the presumption,” since the plaintiffs in Al Shimari 
sought to enforce the customary law of nations against torture.96  
The court also stated that the case did not present any potential 
problems associated with bringing foreign nationals into U.S. courts 
to answer for conduct committed abroad, given that the defendants 
were U.S. citizens.97  Unlike the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit 
in Al Shimari employed the touch and concern test “by considering 
a broader range of facts than just the location where the plaintiffs 
actually sustained their injuries.”98 
Most recently, in Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
similarly rejected a blanket ruling against extraterritoriality and 
remanded the case for further proceedings in light of Kiobel’s 
ambiguous touch and concern standard.99  The plaintiffs were three 
victims of child slavery who alleged that Nestlé and other 
defendants “aided and abetted child slavery by providing assistance 
to Ivorian farmers.”100  The court reasoned that: 
   [d]espite their knowledge of child slavery and their control over the cocoa 
 
 95  Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528. 
 96  Id. at 529–30. 
 97  Id. (“A basic premise of the presumption against extraterritorial application is 
that United States courts must be wary of international discord resulting from 
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations.”) (citing Sexual 
Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304, 322–24 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding that 
Kiobel did not bar ATS claims against an American citizen, in part because “[t]his is not 
a case where a foreign national is being hailed into an unfamiliar court to defend 
himself”)). 
 98  Id. at 529. But see Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 
45–46, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying Kiobel to foreclose jurisdiction over ATS claims 
filed by a Bangladeshi plaintiff who allegedly was detained and tortured by the 
Bangladesh National Police at the direction of his Bangladeshi business partner). 
 99  Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Rather than 
attempt to apply the amorphous touch and concern test on the record currently before 
us, we conclude that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to amend their 
complaint in light of Kiobel.”). 
 100  Id. at 1016–17 (“They were forced to work on Ivorian cocoa plantations for up 
to fourteen hours per day six days a week, given only scraps of food to eat, and whipped 
and beaten by overseers.  They were locked in small rooms at night and not permitted 
to leave the plantations, knowing that children who tried to escape would be beaten 
or tortured.  Plaintiff John Doe II witnessed guards cut open the feet of children who 
attempted to escape, and John Doe III knew that the guards forced failed escapees to 
drink urine.”). 
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market, the defendants operate in the Ivory Coast ‘with the unilateral 
goal of finding the cheapest sources of cocoa.’  The defendants continue 
to supply money, equipment, and training to Ivorian farmers, knowing 
that these provisions will facilitate the use of forced child labor.101 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the court 
should apply the Morrison focus test, noting that while the test may 
be informative, the Supreme Court in Kiobel did not explicitly adopt 
it, instead choosing the touch and concern requirement to articulate 
the legal standard.102 
IV. REEXAMINATION OF CARDONA 
A. Majority Opinion 
In Cardona, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, on 
interlocutory review, determined that the complaints did not state 
claims within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.103  The court did not 
address the specific questions that were certified for review.104  The 
court acknowledged that during the pendency of this appeal, the 
Supreme Court had acted with respect to ATS claims.105  Drawing a 
parallel between Kiobel and Cardona, the court noted that both cases 
involved the commission of tortious actions by a corporation in 
conjunction with paramilitary forces within a foreign territory.106  In 
reaching its holding, the majority maintained that the distinction 
between the corporation in Kiobel, which was merely present in the 
United States, and the corporation in Cardona, a U.S. corporation, 
did not lead to “any indication of a congressional intent to make 
the statute apply to extraterritorial torts. . . . [And,] ‘[i]f Congress 
were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS 
 
 101  Id. at 1017–18 (noting that defendants have also lobbied against congressional 
efforts to curb the use of child slave labor). 
 102  Id. at 1028 (citing Morrison, 130 U.S. at 2284).  The focus test states that a cause 
of action falls outside the presumption against extraterritoriality only if the events or 
relationships that are the focus of congressional concern in the relevant statute occur 
within the United States.  Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669; see Mark J. Mullaney, Ninth Circuit 
Allows Child Slaves to Amend Complaint to Satisfy New Kiobel Standard, INT’L RIGHTS 
ADVOCATES (Sept. 26, 2014, 12:16 PM), http://www.iradvocates.org/blog/ninth-circuit-
allows-child-slaves-amend-complaint-satisfy-new-kiobel-standard (“The court rejected 
the Defendants’ calls to directly apply the restrictive Morrison “focus” test, observing 
that Kiobel explicitly avoided using the terms of art found in Morrison.”). 
 103  Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1187 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 104  Id. at 1188 (“Because we conclude that neither this court nor the district court 
has jurisdiction over the action, we untimely will not answer those specific 
questions . . . .”). 
 105  Id. at 1189. 
 106  Id. 
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would be required.’”107  The court flatly concluded that “[t]here is 
no other statute.  There is no jurisdiction.”108  According to the 
majority, Chiquita’s U.S. citizenship was completely irrelevant to 
the ATS evaluation.109 
The court rationalized its holding by noting the history of the 
ATS, specifically Sosa, precluded the court from applying the ATS to 
the allegations in Cardona.110  In evaluating the touch and concern 
test, the majority stated, “[t]here is no allegation that any torture 
occurred on U.S. territory, or that any other act constituting a tort in 
terms of the ATS touched or concerned the territory of the United 
States with any force.”111  The majority offered no further 
explanation.  Consequently, as the murders at the center of the 
plaintiffs’ allegations took place in Colombia, the majority chose 
not to apply the touch and concern test at all, reflecting the 
restrictive version of the test advocated by Justice Alito’s concurrence 
in Kiobel.112  However, many have criticized the ruling as impudent 
in light of the facts and the infamous legacy of Chiquita’s operations 
in developing nations.113  The majority did not address, let alone 
consider, the allegations of U.S.-based aiding and abetting, or that 
Chiquita’s actions were U.S. crimes under anti-terrorism laws.114 
B. Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Martin, in dissent, argued that the facts of Cardona are 
sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality for 
two reasons.115  First, the primary defendant was Chiquita Brands 
International, a corporation headquartered and incorporated within 
the territory of the United States.116  Second, Chiquita “participated 
in a campaign of torture and murder in Colombia by reviewing, 
 
 107  Id. (quoting Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669). 
 108  Id. 
 109  See generally Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
 110  Id. at 1190. 
 111  Id. at 1191. 
 112  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669–70 (2013) (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
 113  Cohen, supra note 8 (“This opinion is shockingly negligent in terms of just 
actually dealing with the facts and dealing with the issues . . . . It’s almost flippant in 
terms of just gleefully throwing the case out.”) (quoting Terry Collingsworth, one of 
the chief litigators for the Chiquita victims, in an interview with Think Progress). 
 114  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *14, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 
F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015) (No. 14-777). 
 115  Cardona, 760 F. 3d at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 116  Id. 
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approving, and concealing a scheme of payments and weapons 
shipments to Colombian terrorist organizations, all from their 
corporate offices in the territory of the United States.”117  Chiquita’s 
U.S.-based officials took substantial measures to conceal these 
payments by issuing checks payable to individual employees who 
would endorse the checks, convert them to cash, and then deliver 
the funds to the AUC.118  Through this analysis of the touch and 
concern test, Judge Martin found that the plaintiffs met the Kiobel 
standard.119 
The dissent distinguished the facts from Kiobel by noting that 
the plaintiffs did not rely on Chiquita’s “mere corporate presence” 
to justify ATS jurisdiction, as Chiquita is incorporated in New Jersey 
and headquartered in Ohio.120  This was not a case, Judge Martin 
stated, where a defendant was being haled into court under the ATS 
for actions that took place on foreign soil, or where plaintiffs were 
seeking to circumvent the presumption against extraterritoriality by 
holding an American company vicariously liable for the 
unauthorized action of its subsidiaries overseas.121  Thus, the dissent 
concluded that the touch and concern test is satisfied when a 
defendant aids and abets overseas torts from within the United 
States.122  Judge Martin derided the court’s unwillingness to enforce 
the ATS, saying that, by doing so, “we disarm innocents against 
American corporations that engage in human rights violations 
abroad.  I understand the ATS to have been deliberately crafted to 
avoid this regrettable result.”123 
C. Distinguishing Kiobel from Cardona 
Through its mechanical application of Kiobel in Cardona, the 
Eleventh Circuit ignored major distinctions between the two 
 
 117  Id. 
 118  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 114, at *7. 
 119  Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 120  Id. at 1192. 
 121  Id. at 1194. 
 122  Id. at 1194–95 (Martin, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier 
Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528 (4th Cir. 2014); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 
F. Supp. 2d 304, 323–24 (D. Mass. 2013); Mwani v. Laden 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 
(D.D.C. 2013); Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-CV-05395, 2014 WL 1669873, at 
*29–30 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014). 
 123  Cardona, 760 F. 3d at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting); Lauren Carasik, The Uphill 
Battle to Hold US Corporations Accountable for Abuses Abroad, ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Aug. 8, 
2014, 6:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/chiquita-corporate 
accountabilityunitednationshumanrights.html.  
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cases.124  In Kiobel, all of the alleged atrocities were committed in 
Nigeria, the defendants were Dutch, British, and Nigerian 
corporations, and their only relevant connections to the United 
States consisted of their corporate listing on the New York Stock 
Exchange and their affiliation with a public relations office in New 
York.125  “Moreover, none of the defendants had engaged in any 
activities in the United States that appeared to be relevant to the 
claimed tortious acts that occurred in Nigeria.”126 
Thus, the Cardona majority adopted the Second Circuit’s 
approach and held that the “ATS contains nothing to rebut the 
presumption against extraterritoriality” and, since the conduct at 
issue occurred in Colombia, the ATS was inapplicable.127  Yet the 
facts of Kiobel and Cardona are decidedly distinguishable.  Unlike the 
corporations in Kiobel, Chiquita is incorporated in New Jersey and 
headquartered in Ohio.  These facts subject Chiquita to U.S. 
regulation and make the United States responsible for its acts under 
international law.128  The plaintiffs sought to hold Chiquita liable 
for conduct that occurred in the United States: in particular, one 
hundred separate payments to the AUC that Chiquita reviewed, 
approved, and directed at the highest corporate levels from its U.S. 
headquarters.129 
In contrast to the acts of the corporations in Kiobel, Chiquita 
actively participated in a campaign of torture and murder in 
Colombia by reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of 
payments and weapons shipments to a Colombian terrorist 
organization, all from its corporate offices in the United States.130  
At numerous times, Chiquita affirmatively continued to pay the 
 
 124  Press Release, International Rights Advocates, Eleventh Circuit Decision in 
Chiquita Tort Status Litigation (July, 25, 2014), available at http://www.iradvocates.org 
/press-release/chiquita/press-release-eleventh-circuit-decision-chiquita-alien-tort-
status-litigation. 
 125  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1677–78 (2013) (Breyer, 
J., concurring); see also Paul L. Hoffman, Commentary on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.: First Impressions, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 28, 31 (2013) (“Though the 
Court reformulated the question presented broadly, the application of the ATS to such 
so-called ‘foreign-cubed’ cases was at the heart of most of the briefing and argument.”). 
 126  See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 127  Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
 128  Id. at 1192; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 3, at 6, 15.  
 129  Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 3, at 15. 
 130  Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting) (concluding that plaintiff’s 
claims sufficiently “touch and concern” the territory of the United States because they 
allege the Chiquita violation international law from within the U.S. by offering 
substantial assistance to a campaign of violence abroad).  
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AUC.  In March 2000, the payments were directly brought to the 
attention of its senior executives during a board meeting.131  In late 
February 2003, outside counsel advised Chiquita to stop payments 
to the AUC, and in April 2003, even the Justice Department 
admonished Chiquita.132  “Defendant Chiquita continued to pay 
the AUC even after one of its directors acknowledged in an internal 
email, on December 22, 2003, that, [] ‘we appear to be committing 
a felony.’”133  Still the payments continued. 
In Cardona, the plaintiffs did not seek to circumvent the 
presumption against extraterritoriality by holding Chiquita 
vicariously liable for the unauthorized actions of its subsidiaries in 
Colombia.  Chiquita was a direct a participant in “widespread and 
systematic human rights violations with indisputable evidence of 
actions taken by Chiquita in the United States.”134  If Kiobel 
represents the end of the spectrum where the only connection to the 
United States is mere corporate presence, Cardona falls on the 
opposite end, representing substantial and repeated connections 
with the United States. 
The majority in Cardona mechanically applied the holding of 
Kiobel and failed to advance the purposes of the presumption.135  
The Eleventh Circuit proclaimed that “because our ultimate 
disposition is not dependent on specificity of fact, we will only 
briefly review the history of the case.”136  The majority opinion in 
Kiobel did not assert that the ATS only reaches domestic conduct—
this interpretation appeared only in Justice Alito’s concurrence.137  
Justice Alito’s “broader” approach was more restrictive in that it 
would bar an ATS action “unless the domestic conduct is sufficient 
to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s 
requirements of definiteness and acceptance amongst civilized 
nations.”138  It is also significant that Chiquita pled guilty to 
providing support to the AUC, despite its designation as a terrorist 
organization that threatens U.S. national security.139  The U.S. 
 
 131  Chiquita Sentencing Hearing, supra note 5, at 9. 
 132  Id. at 10. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 114, at *17. 
 135  Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 529–31. 
 136  Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1187–88. 
 137  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 138  Id.; see discussion supra Part II.C; see also Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527 (stating that 
“such an analysis is far more circumscribed than the majority opinion’s requirement”).  
 139  Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 3, at 15. 
STYLIANOU FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  9:05 PM 
2015] UNPEELING THE GROWING SPLIT 239 
government has concluded that providing support to the AUC 
directly concerns vital national interests, and violates U.S. foreign 
policy and criminal law.140  Thus, Cardona undermines U.S. foreign 
policy and fails to reinforce international comity.141 
The dissent in Cardona reasoned that Kiobel should not be read 
as “an impediment to civilians harmed by a decades-long campaign 
of terror they plainly allege to have been sponsored by an American 
corporation.”142  As the Second Circuit did in Balintulo, the Eleventh 
Circuit did not address crucial facts in reaching its conclusion, 
namely, the panel did not explain how Chiquita’s support for a 
terrorist organization could violate U.S. criminal law and 
undermine U.S. security, but not touch and concern the United 
States.143  Not only did Chiquita aid and abet crimes against 
humanity, they also interfered with the foreign policy of the United 
States, actions that should satisfy the touch and concern test and 
allow for ATS jurisdiction. 
D. Inconsistency with International Law 
“To begin with, it is a fundamental principle of international 
law that every State has the sovereign authority to regulate the 
conduct of its own citizens, regardless of whether that conduct 
occurs inside or outside of the State’s territory.”144  The Restatement 
of Foreign Relations Law explicitly says that a state may exercise 
jurisdiction “with respect to the activities, interests, status, or 
 
 140  Id. at 20. 
 141  See, e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice, Chiquita Brands International 
Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization And Agrees 
to Pay $25 Million Fine (Mar. 19, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd_161.html (“The message to industry from this guilty plea 
today is that the U.S. Government will bring its full power to bear in the investigation 
of those who conduct business with designated terrorist organizations, even when 
those acts occur outside of the United States.”). 
 142  Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting); see also Jonathan Stempel, 
Chiquita Wins Dismissal of U.S. Lawsuits over Colombian Abuses, REUTERS (July 24, 2014, 
3:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/24/chiquita-colombia-decision-
idUSL2N0PZ28P20140724 (“Chiquita in March 2007 pleaded guilty to a U.S. criminal 
charge and paid a $25 million fine for having made payments from 1997 through 
February 2004 to the right-wing paramilitary group United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia, known in Spanish as AUC.”).  
 143  See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 31 C.F.R. § 594.201 (2001) (blocking transactions 
with terrorists deemed to “threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States”).  
 144  See Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1193 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987)). 
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relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.”145  
Kiobel reaffirmed that the primary basis for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is protection against “unintended clashes between 
our laws and those of other nations which could result in 
international discord” that “should make courts particularly wary of 
impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive 
branches in managing foreign affairs.”146  By insufficiently 
considering basic human rights, courts that have denied jurisdiction 
under the ATS have not met the expectations of the international 
community and have not recognized rights universally proclaimed 
by all nations.147  Through the enactment of the ATS, the United 
States consciously accepted an obligation to provide a remedy to 
those injured by its own citizens under international law. 
In Kiobel, the European Commission submitted an amicus brief 
that claimed that the assertion of ATS jurisdiction over corporations 
in its member countries violated international law.148  These same 
concerns are inapplicable in Cardona, where the defendant is a U.S. 
citizen.  In agreement, the United States argued in their Kiobel brief 
that “the court should not articulate a categorical rule foreclosing 
any such application of the ATS,” as the United States may be 
responsible under international law for the actions of U.S. citizens 
abroad.149  If a corporation, incorporated and headquartered in the 
United States while operating worldwide, supports from within the 
territory of the United States the murder of thousands of people, it 
violates international law.  As the Supreme Court stated over one 
hundred years ago: 
   International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.  For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be 
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of 
these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, 
research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well 
 
 145  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987). 
 146  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013). 
 147  Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Our holding today . . . 
is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people 
from brutal violence.”). 
 148  See Brief for the European Comm’n on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6, 24–28, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). 
 149  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Affirmance at 
15, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). 
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acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.150 
The Cardona court, and courts that have ruled similarly 
regarding the ATS, have not met the expectations of international 
comity and have declined to recognize rights universally proclaimed 
by all nations.151  In doing so, these courts have declined an 
opportunity to provide a substantive remedy for victims like those 
in Chiquita. 
E. Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the ATS 
Chiquita’s acts of aiding and abetting extra-judicial killings, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity, which originated in the 
United States, are themselves torts in violation of the law of nations.  
Aiding and abetting is recognized as a valid basis for liability under 
the ATS, and it is a well-established norm of international law.152  
“All international authorities agree that at least purposive action . . . 
constitutes aiding and abetting”; however, there is disagreement 
regarding whether the mens rea required for an aiding and abetting 
claim is knowledge or purpose.153  For many ATS cases, the 
unresolved aiding and abetting standard could have great 
implications for actions against transnational corporate defendants, 
as the purpose requirement is a much higher standard than the 
knowledge requirement. 
Regardless of the standard, defendants in Chiquita may be held 
liable under ATS as a result of the theory of aiding and abetting.  It 
is clear that Chiquita had knowledge that it was cooperating with a 
known terrorist organization and that it repeatedly ignored its 
counsel’s advice to end its relationship with the AUC.  The facts 
demonstrate that Chiquita acted with a purpose to violate the law 
by maintaining contact with and supporting the AUC financially in 
exchange for asserting dominance in the banana growing region. 
F. Corporate Liability Under the ATS 
The question of the possibility of ATS litigation against 
corporations has attracted attention, as well as inconclusive 
answers.154  The corporate accountability movement, coupled with 
 
 150  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 151  Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (“Our holding today . . . is a small but important step 
in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.”). 
 152  Doe I v. Nestlé, USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1024 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in 
original). 
 153  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 154  Hathaway, supra note 48 (“Those celebrating the demise of the ATS may thus 
find themselves surprised to discover that the end result of the Supreme Court’s 
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reservations regarding the potential impact on the business 
environment, has led to starkly divergent responses.155  The drastic 
growth of transnational business and globalization has created a 
safe haven for multinational corporations in both developed and 
underdeveloped countries that lack appropriate regulation.156  This 
section will argue that a defendant’s corporate identity should not 
be dispositive in deciding whether there is jurisdiction under the 
ATS.  To hold otherwise would be to immunize U.S. corporate 
entities operating in the developing world from “liability arising 
from their facilitation of torture, destruction of property, extra-
judicial killing, and environmental catastrophes.”157 
One of the most prominent issues that the Supreme Court left 
unanswered in Kiobel was whether the law of nations recognizes 
corporate liability—whether multinational corporations can be 
held civilly liable under the ATS for their actions or the actions of 
their subsidiaries and agents.158  The only reference that the Supreme 
Court has made toward corporate liability under the ATS is a 
footnote in Sosa, where the Court directed federal courts 
contemplating the recognition of new ATS claims to consider 
“whether international law extends the scope of liability for a 
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued[] if the 
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”159  
The Court did not address criminal liability, and some have 
questioned whether civil liability alone is an adequate response to 
“corporate participation in unimaginable crimes that deeply shock 
the conscience of humanity.”160 
 
decision yesterday may not be the end of the ATS after all, but instead a renewed focus 
of ATS litigation on U.S. corporations.”). 
 155  See Nathan Koppel, Arcane Law Brings Conflicts from Overseas to U.S. Courts, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB125133677355 
962497 (noting that litigation has proven controversial). 
 156  GWYNNE SKINNER ET AL., THE THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 146 (2013), available at http:// 
icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/The-Third-Pillar-Access-to-Judicial-Remedies-
for-Human-Rights-Violation-by-Transnational-Business.pdf (“States are failing in their 
obligation to ensure access to elective judicial remedies to victims of human rights 
violations by businesses operating outside their territory.”). 
 157  Colin Kearney, Case Comment, International Human Rights - Corporate Liability 
Claims not Actionable Under the Alien Tort Statute - Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263, 270 (2011).  
 158  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662. 
 159  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) (referencing the 
contrasting decisions of the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit). 
 160  James G. Stewart, The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes: 
Transcending the Alien Tort Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 121, 179 (2014) (arguing 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed three principles of ATS liability in 
Doe I v. Nestlé.161  First, the analysis proceeds norm-by-norm: there 
is no categorical rule of corporate immunity or liability.162  Second, 
corporate liability under an ATS claim does not depend on the 
existence of international precedent enforcing legal norms against 
corporations.163  Third, norms that are “universal and absolute,” or 
applicable to “all actors,” can provide the basis for an ATS claim 
against a corporation.164  To determine whether a norm is universal, 
courts consider, among other things, whether it is “limited to states” 
and whether its application depends on the identity of the 
perpetrator.165  The court concluded that three former child slaves 
could assert their ATS claim against corporate defendants, as the 
prohibition against slavery is universal and applies to state actors 
and non-state actors alike.166 
G. Human Rights Law 
ATS litigation has highlighted the need for corporations to 
seriously consider their involvement in any potential human rights 
violations, irrespective of an ultimate finding of liability.167  In its 
amicus brief in Kiobel, the European Commission argued that some 
wrongs are “so repugnant that all States have a legitimate interest 
and therefore have the authority to suppress and punish them.”168  
It is likely that in the wake of post-Kiobel litigation, plaintiffs will 
focus heavily on forum shopping depending on the facts of each 
case, and will look for alternatives in transnational tort litigation.169 
 
coupling corporate criminal liability with international crimes in national systems is 
the next obvious “discovery” in corporate responsibility). 
 161  Doe I v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sarei v. 
Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), judgment vacated, Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 
133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013)). 
 162  Id.  
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. 
 166  Id. 
 167  See generally Santiago A. Cueto, Alien Tort Claims Act: A Threat to U.S. Corporation 
Operating Overseas?, INT’L BUS. LAW ADVISOR (Oct. 9, 2009), http://internationalbusiness 
lawadvisor.com/alien-tort-claims-act-a-threat-to-u-s-corporations-operating-overseas/. 
 168  See Brief for the European Comm’n on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 8, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 
1659 (2013). 
 169 Benjamin Hoffman & Marissa Vahlsing, Collaborative Lawyering in 
Transnational Human Rights Advocacy, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 255, 263–64 (2014):   
  Litigation under the [ATS] is complex, drawn-out over many years, and 
results hinge on minute issues of civil procedure.  In many cases, the 
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Allowing U.S. defendants to be sued for human rights abuses 
advances the policy of denying safe haven.170  Filartiga underscores 
this importance.  That case paved the way for seeking accountability 
in U.S. courts by permitting suits against those defendants who 
enjoy the protection of the U.S. legal system and whose egregious 
behavior is therefore a legitimate U.S. concern.171  Redress for 
human rights violations requires due diligence.  Thus, it is not that 
the state guarantees a remedy for every violation, but instead, due 
diligence obligations are usually considered obligations of conduct.  
Due diligence compels institutions, such as courts, to operate 
prudently. “States may incur responsibility if they are not diligent in 
pursuing and preventing acts contrary to international law by 
prosecuting and punishing the private perpetrators.”172  
Nonetheless, human rights law does not bind non-state actors; 
however, corporate due diligence considerations are developing. 
In this vein, John Ruggie, the United Nations Secretary-
General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, 
and an important contributor to international relations, developed 
“Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework” (the 
“Ruggie Framework”).173  The Ruggie Framework has shown itself to 
be influential.  In September 2013, the United Kingdom became the 
 
principal legal struggle concerns questions of international law and 
federal jurisdiction—issues such as the mens rea standard for aiding and 
abetting under international law or the ramifications of the difference 
between corporate and natural personhood.  Briefing and arguing these 
questions can take years.  During this time, the stories of the clients (the 
merits, or facts) hardly come to light.  In such instances, we have had to 
explain to clients that the question at hand is no longer (or not yet) about 
whether or not they have suffered the harms they claim to have suffered, 
but rather about whether or not the court will agree with them that 
having suffered those harms is legally significant in a U.S. court.  This can 
have the effect of obscuring, rather than highlighting, the wrongs for 
which they seek recognition and redress. 
 170  Brief for Dolly Filartiga, et al. as Amici Curiae at 16, Al Shimari v. CACI Premier 
Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-2162) (“For more than 30 years, the 
ATS has served a vital role in holding human rights abusers accountable and in 
providing redress to victims. The Supreme Court has affirmed this role.”). 
 171  Id. at 16. 
 172  DUNCAN FRENCH & TIM STEPHENS, ILA STUDY GROUP ON DUE DILIGENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRST REPORT 11 (2014), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/ 
committees/study _groups.cfm/cid/1045.  
 173  UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles, BUS. & HUMAN 
RIGHTS RES. CTR., http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-special-
representative-on-business-human-rights/un-protect-respect-and-remedy-framework-
and-guiding-principles (last accessed Dec. 20, 2015).  
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first country to launch its implementation plan, which guides 
companies on integrating human rights into their operations.174  
The action plan demonstrates “important leadership in relation to 
the protection of human rights defenders working on issues of 
corporation accountability.”175  Most notably, the action plan is 
intended to apply to U.K. companies operating both at home and 
extraterritorially.176  Further, amendments to the U.K. Companies 
Act has clarified that company directors will include human rights 
issues in their annual reports.177 
V. CONCLUSION 
Cardona reflects a narrow interpretation of the standard set by 
the Supreme Court in Kiobel, in light of the major distinctions 
between the two cases.  In an effort to strengthen international and 
multinational corporate accountability, the United States and the 
Supreme Court should not allow the growing power of 
multinational corporations to hinder the development of a standard 
and framework that can properly regulate the conduct of citizens, 
whether individuals or corporations, on foreign soil. Cardona set a 
precedent that creates burdensome obstacles in the path of victims 
seeking remedy for abusive corporate actions abroad.178 
Courts should not apply Kiobel narrowly.  To apply an 
ambiguous and unsettled standard so restrictively is imprudent.  The 
 
 174  Press Release, United Kingdom, UK First to Launch Action Plan on Business and 
Human Rights (Sept. 4, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-
first-to-launch-action-plan-on-business-and-human-rights.  
 175  Michael Ineichen, UK Shows Welcome Leadership on Human Rights Defenders and 
Corporate Accountability, INT’L SERV. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.ishr.ch/news/uk-shows-welcome-leadership-human-rights-defenders-
and-corporate-accountability. 
 176  Id. 
 177  JOHN RUGGIE, JOHN RUGGIE AND SHIFT COMMENTS TO FINANCIAL REPORTING 
COUNCIL’S EXPOSURE DRAFT: GUIDANCE ON THE STRATEGIC REPORT 1 (2013), available at ht 
tp://shiftproject.org/sites/default/files/John%20Ruggie%20and%20Shift%20Comme
nts%20to%20FRC%20Exposure%20Draft%202013%2011%2015.pdf (last accessed 
Dec. 20, 2015).  
 178  Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015) (denying petition 
of writ of certiorari); see also Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Top Court Rejects Colombian Human 
Rights Suit, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2015, 2:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015 
/04/20/us-usa-court-rights-idUSKBN0NB1I520150420; Valentina Stackl, Supreme 
Court Allows U.S. Corporation to Finance Terrorism Without Accountability, EARTHRIGHTS 
INT’L (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.earthrights.org/media/supreme-court-allows-us-
corporation-finance-terrorism-without- accountability (“By declining to hear the case, 
the Supreme Court has created yet another obstacle in the path of victims seeking 
remedies for abusive corporate actions abroad, and allows a US corporation to get away 
with financing terrorism without accountability to its victims in US courts.”).  
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Eleventh Circuit’s declination to address the allegations that the 
relevant illegal behavior took place inside the United States—when 
determining if the conduct touched and concerned the United States 
sufficiently to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality—
is in conflict with both Kiobel and with other circuit courts. 
 
